Related Contentin Hidalgo County
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Ruling
Heidi Harmon vs Sara Nelson, et al
Jul 26, 2024 |23CV02538
23CV02538HARMON v. NELSON et al. (UNOPPOSED) DEFENDANTS THE ROMERO INSTITUTE AND SARA NELSON’S MOTION TO APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO SEAL DEFENDANTS’ 998 OFFER TO COMPROMISE The unopposed motion is granted. On 5/20/24, defendants erroneously filed their Offer toCompromise. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d), the court finds that thereexists an overriding interest that overcomes the right to public access to the record, thatoverriding interest supports sealing the record, a substantial probability exists that the overridinginterest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed, the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored,and no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.
Ruling
TATUM vs EDGES ELECTRICAL GROUP, LLC
Jul 25, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Wrongful Termination) |24CV068271
24CV068271: TATUM vs EDGES ELECTRICAL GROUP, LLC 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 24Tentative Ruling - 07/22/2024 Rebekah EvensonDefendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.Plaintiff does not dispute that he executed an undated “Voluntary Arbitration Agreement”(hereinafter “the Agreement”) with Defendant. The claims that Plaintiff asserts in this case fallwithin the scope of the Agreement.The Court observes that the parties’ evidence concerning the circ*mstances under which Plaintiffsigned the Agreement is conflicting. Defendant’s former Accounting Assistant JoannKillingsworth submits a declaration that Plaintiff signed the Agreement as part of his new hireorientation on or about September 29, 2020. Plaintiff’s opposition brief (but not his declaration)states that he had already been working for Defendant since 2018, but he appears to agree that hesigned the agreement in 2020 (or at least, he does not deny it.)Plaintiff’s declaration states that he was presented with the Agreement in connection withDefendant’s settlement of a pending class action, and that he was told he had to sign theAgreement to get the settlement check. However, Defendant presents evidence that contradictsPlaintiff’s recollection of events. The class action that Plaintiff references was not even fileduntil 2021, and Plaintiff was given the settlement check in 2023. (See the Declaration of NancyCooper filed with the reply papers.) Therefore, Defendant contends Plaintiff could not have beentold in 2020 that the Agreement had anything to do with the settlement of the class action. Giventhe vagueness of Plaintiff’s declaration and the documentary evidence submitted by Defendantabout the class action to which Plaintiff refers, the Court finds Defendant’s evidence morecredible on this issue.The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the Agreement is void based on the doctrine of “fraudin the inception”. As indicated above, given the timing of when Plaintiff appears to concede hesigned the Agreement and when the class action case was filed and settled, Plaintiff’sexplanation that he understood the Agreement was related to the class action and that he was toldhe had to sign the Agreement to receive the class action settlement check is not credible. Buteven if the Court were to credit Plaintiff’s declaration, he does not state that any employee oragent of Defendant told him the Agreement was not an arbitration agreement; he merely assumedthe Agreement was related to the class action settlement (which Plaintiff was not paid until threeyears later) because he was told he had to sign the Agreement to receive the settlement check.In addition, the five page agreement is titled “VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT”;contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the word “Accounting” does not appear anywhere in or near thetitle of the Agreement. No one reading the Agreement could fail to understand that it was anarbitration agreement, and not a document relating to the settlement of a class action.The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable on the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 24CV068271: TATUM vs EDGES ELECTRICAL GROUP, LLC 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 24grounds of unconscionability. In order for a party to oppose enforcement of an arbitrationagreement on the grounds of unconscionability, that party must show that the agreement wasboth procedurally and substantively unconscionable. (See, e.g., Oto LLC v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th111, 125.)For the reasons stated above, the Court does not find credible Plaintiff’s argument that theAgreement was procedurally unconscionable (i.e., that he felt pressure to sign the Agreement in2020 in order to receive a class action settlement check for a case that was not filed until 2021and a check that was not issued until 2023.) But even if the Court were to find some level ofprocedural unconscionability in Plaintiff’s execution of the Agreement, Plaintiff does notdemonstrate any substantive unconscionability in the Agreement.The Agreement complies with the requirements for agreements to arbitrate employment disputesset forth in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services Inc. (2020) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.Plaintiff contends the provision of the Agreement that “each party shall bear their own standardlitigation type costs, such as deposition fees, transcript fees, and witness fees” conflicts withCode of Civil Procedure § 1282.5(b). The Court disagrees. Code of Civil Procedure § 1282.5(b)provides that in a consumer arbitration, a certified shorthand reporter shall be provided uponrequest of an indigent consumer, at the expense of the nonconsumer party. No provision of theAgreement negates the application of § 1282.5(b) or requires Plaintiff to pay for the cost ofretaining a certified shorthand reporter.But even assuming the Agreement could be construed as negating the application of § 1282.5(b),that is the only (purportedly) unconscionable provision of the Agreement identified by Plaintiff.Therefore, assuming the provision in the Agreement that each party shall bear its own “transcriptfees” is substantively unconscionable because it (impliedly) conflicts with § 1282.5(b), the Courtwould exercise its discretion to sever that provision and enforce the remainder of the agreement.(Civil Code § 1670.5 and Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 121-122.)Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate the claims he asserts in this case, pursuant to the terms of the“Voluntary Arbitration Agreement”.This case is STAYED pending completion of the parties’ arbitration, pursuant to Code of CivilProcedure § 1281.4.The Case Management Conference currently scheduled for August 6, 2024 is CONTINUED toAugust 5, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 24. By no later than July 22, 2025, the parties shallfile a joint status report indicating whether the arbitration has been completed, or if not, when itis expected to be completed.The Initial Case Management Conference scheduled for 08/06/2024 is continued to 08/05/2025at 09:00 AM in Department 24 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse .
Ruling
Irma Tapia vs Posada Associates, et al
Jul 22, 2024 |23CV00355
23CV00355TAPIA v. POSADA ASSOCIATES, et al. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT The motion is granted. The court finds that the settlement falls within a range of reasonableness and ispresumptively valid; appears to be a product of serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations;and has no obvious deficiencies. The court grants approval of the Settlement Agreement.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 1 of 1
Ruling
HERMINIO CEPEDA vs. ALLIED LANDSCAPE SERVICES, INC.
Jul 18, 2024 |C23-01980
C23-01980CASE NAME: HERMINIO CEPEDA VS. ALLIED LANDSCAPE SERVICES, INC.*HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: PRELIMINARY APPROVALFILED BY: CEPEDA, HERMINIO DERAS*TENTATIVE RULING:*Plaintiff Herminio Cepeda moves for preliminary approval of his class action and PAGA settlementwith defendant Allied Landscape Services, Inc. The motion is granted. A. Background and Settlement TermsDefendant is, as its name suggests, in the business of designing, installing, and maintaininglandscaping and irrigation. Plaintiff was employed there in a non-exempt position between May 2021and August 2022, though his job position is not described.The original complaint was filed on August 10, 2023 as a class action. PAGA claims were added bylater amendment.The settlement would create a gross settlement fund of $500,000. The class representative paymentto the plaintiff would be $7,500. Attorney’s fees would be $166,667 (one-third of the settlement).Litigation costs would not exceed $18,000. The settlement administrator’s costs are estimated at$10,000. PAGA penalties would be $50,000, resulting in a payment of $37,500 to the LWDA. The netamount paid directly to the class members would be about $247,833, not including distribution ofPAGA penalties. The fund is non-reversionary. There are an estimated 502 class members. Based onthe estimated class size, the average net payment for each class member is approximately $494. Theindividual payments will vary considerably, however, because of the allocation formula proratingpayments according to the number of weeks worked during the relevant time. The number ofa*ggrieved employees for PAGA purposes is smaller, about 244, because the starting date of therelevant period is later.The entire settlement amount will be deposited with the settlement administrator within 30 daysafter the effective date of the settlement.The proposed settlement would certify a class of all current and former non-exempt employeesemployed at Defendants’ California facilities between August 10, 2019 and June 30, 2024. For PAGApurposes, the period covered by the settlement is August 10, 2022 to June 30, 2024.The class members will not be required to file a claim. Class members may object or opt out of thesettlement. (Aggrieved employees cannot opt out of the PAGA portion of the settlement.) Fundswould be apportioned to class members based on the number of workweeks worked during the classperiod.A list of class members will be provided to the settlement administrator within 14 days afterpreliminary approval. Various prescribed follow-up steps will be taken with respect to mail that is SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024returned as undeliverable. Settlement checks not cashed within 180 days will be cancelled, and thefunds will be directed to the controller’s unclaimed property fund.The settlement contains release language covering all claims and causes of action, alleged or whichcould have reasonably been alleged based on the allegations in the operative pleading, including anumber of specified claims. Under recent appellate authority, the limitation to those claims with the“same factual predicate” as those alleged in the complaint is critical. (Amaro v. Anaheim ArenaMgmt., LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537 (“A court cannot release claims that are outside the scopeof the allegations of the complaint.”) “Put another way, a release of claims that goes beyond thescope of the allegations in the operative complaint’ is impermissible.” (Id., quoting Marshall v.Northrop Grumman Corp. (C.D. Cal.2020) 469 F.Supp.3d 942, 949.)Formal discovery was undertaken, resulting in the production of substantial documents. The mattersettled after arms-length negotiations, which included a session with an experienced mediator.Counsel also has provided an analysis of the case, and how the settlement compares to the potentialvalue of the case, after allowing for various risks and contingencies. For example, much of plaintiff’sallegations centers on possible off-the-clock work, including missed or skipped meal breaks and restbreaks. Defendant, however, pointed out that its formal policies prohibit off-the-clock work, andasserted that it would have had no knowledge of employees beginning work before punching in orcontinuing after punching out. Further, it argued that it was required to make meal and rest breaksavailable, but not required to ensure that they be taken, so long as no employer policy prevented ordiscouraged taking such breaks. As to unreimbursed employee expenses (such as cell phone use,mileage, and masks), plaintiff would have been called on to show that such expenses were in factincurred, were reasonably necessary to job performance, and were unreimbursed. Furthermore, thefact-intensive character of such claims would have presented a serious obstacle to class certification.The potential liability needs to be adjusted for various evidence and risk-based contingencies,including problems of proof. PAGA penalties are difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons: theyderive from other violations, they include “stacking” of violations, the law may only allow applicationof the “initial violation” penalty amount, and the total amount may be reduced in the discretion ofthe court. (See Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) (PAGA penalties may be reduced where “based on the factsand circ*mstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjustarbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”)) Moreover, recent decisions may make it difficult forPAGA plaintiffs to recover statutory penalties, as opposed to actual missed wages. (See, e.g., Naranjov. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056.)Counsel attest that notice of the proposed settlement was transmitted to the LWDA concurrentlywith the filing of the motion. B. Legal StandardsThe primary determination to be made is whether the proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, andadequate,” under Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801, including “the strength ofplaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk ofmaintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024discovery completed and the state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, thepresence of a governmental participant, and the reaction … to the proposed settlement.” (See alsoAmaro, 69 Cal.App.5th 521.)Because this matter also proposes to settle PAGA claims, the Court also must consider the criteriathat apply under that statute. Recently, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, provided guidance on this issue. In Moniz, the court found that the “fair,reasonable, and adequate” standard applicable to class actions applies to PAGA settlements. (Id., at64.) The Court also held that the trial court must assess “the fairness of the settlement’s allocation ofcivil penalties between the affected aggrieved employees”. (Id., at 64-65.)California law provides some general guidance concerning judicial approval of any settlement. First,public policy generally favors settlement. (Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th273.) Nonetheless, the court should not approve an agreement contrary to law or public policy.(Bechtel Corp. v. Superior Court (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 405, 412; Timney v. Lin (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th1121, 1127.) Moreover, “The court cannot surrender its duty to see that the judgment to be enteredis a just one, nor is the court to act as a mere puppet in the matter.” (California State Auto. Assn.Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664.) As a result, courts have specificallynoted that Neary does not always apply, because “Where the rights of the public are implicated, theadditional safeguard of judicial review, though more cumbersome to the settlement process, serves asalutatory purpose.” (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2006) 141Cal.App.4th 48, 63.)The settlement agreement includes an escalator provision, to be triggered in the event that thenumber of covered employees or work weeks turns out to be materially higher than now estimated. Ifthe clause is triggered and the defendant elects to increase the total payment, no further approvalwill be needed. The parties are cautioned, however, that in the event the clause would result in asignificant modification of the settlement (such as cutting back the covered period), it would beprudent to seek further approval from the Court. C. Attorney FeesPlaintiff seeks one-third of the total settlement amount as fees, relying on the “common fund”theory. Even a proper common fund-based fee award, however, should be reviewed through alodestar cross-check. In Lafitte v. Robert Half International (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503, the SupremeCourt endorsed the use of a lodestar cross-check as a way to determine whether the percentageallocated is reasonable. It stated: “If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check isextraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should beadjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is notnecessarily required to make such an adjustment.” (Id., at 505.) Following typical practice, however,the fee award will not be considered at this time, but only as part of final approval.Similarly, litigation and administration costs and the requested representative payment of $7,500 forthe plaintiff will be reviewed at time of final approval. Criteria for evaluation of representative SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024payment requests are discussed in Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th785, 804-07. D. Discussion and ConclusionThe Court finds that the settlement is sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate to justify preliminaryapproval.Counsel will be directed to prepare an order reflecting this tentative ruling, the other findings in thepreviously submitted proposed order, and to obtain a hearing date for the motion for final approvalfrom the Department clerk. Other dates in the scheduled notice process should track as appropriateto the hearing date. The ultimate judgment must provide for a compliance hearing after thesettlement has been completely implemented. Plaintiffs’ counsel are to submit a compliancestatement one week before the compliance hearing date. Five percent of the attorney’s fees are to bewithheld by the claims administrator pending satisfactory compliance as found by the Court.
Ruling
LAGAR vs MISSION FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
Jul 22, 2024 |CVRI2302416
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMENDCOMPLAINT ON COMPLAINT FORLAGAR VS MISSIONWRONGFUL TERMINATION (OVERCVRI2302416 FINANCIAL SERVICES$25,000) OF MISSION FINANCIALCORPORATIONSERVICES CORPORATION BYLETICIA LAGARTentative Ruling: Motion for leave to amend is granted however Plaintiff must file andserve the amended complaint.
Ruling
ADAMS vs PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION, et al.
Jul 25, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Other Employment Complaint Case) |24CV064049
24CV064049: ADAMS vs PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Informal Discovery Conference; filed by Mark Adams (Plaintiff) in Department 25Tentative Ruling - 07/25/2024 Jenna WhitmanThe Motion re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR INFORMAL DISCOVERYCONFERENCE filed by Mark Adams on 05/20/2024 is Denied.The undersigned does not conduct IDCs. To the extent defendant(s) take the position that theyneed not respond to discovery until the pleadings are settled, that is incorrect. However, plaintiffhas not filed a motion establishing, through evidence, that defendants failed to produce witnessesfor duly noticed depositions or that third parties have failed to comply with properly servedsubpoenas.This ruling has been contested. Hearing has been continued to 08/02/24 at 3:30 PM.If you plan to appear in person, the hearing will be heard in Wiley W. Manuel Courthouse 661Washington Street, Oakland, CA 94607 5th floor Department 109.The zoom information for this hearing is below:Meeting ID: 161 8066 1142Passcode: 5805---One tap mobile+16692545252,,16180661142# US (San Jose)+14154494000,,16180661142# US (US Spanish Line)---Dial by your location• +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose)• +1 415 449 4000 US (US Spanish Line)• +1 669 216 1590 US (San Jose)• +1 551 285 1373 US (New Jersey)• +1 646 828 7666 US (New York)• +1 646 964 1167 US (US Spanish Line)• 833 568 8864 US Toll-freeFind your local number: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/u/acJeuPd9Xq
Ruling
Mathew Anderson et al. vs Hogan MFG., Inc. a California Corportation et al.
Jul 24, 2024 |STK-CV-UWT-2022-0005599
The court upon its own motion continues hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Relief From Dismissal to Thursday, August 1, 2024 at 9:00am. Hon. George J. Abdallah, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
Reynolds vs. Quality Care Home, Inc., et al.
Jul 26, 2024 |22CV-0200604
REYNOLDS VS. QUALITY CARE HOME, INC., ET AL.Case Number: 22CV-0200604Tentative Ruling on Motion for an Order Compelling a Site Inspection: Plaintiff Lisa Reynolds moves foran Order compelling a site inspection of the Hallmark House, a residential facility owned and operated byDefendant Quality Care Homes, Inc. Defendants Quality Care Homes, Inc. Reema Singh, Gurmeel Singh, andDawn Parra oppose the motion. The Court notes that the Opposition was untimely filed, however, the Courtexercises its discretion to consider the Opposition. The Opposition being one day late did not appear to affectPlaintiff’s ability to respond with a competent Reply.Meet and Confer. Meet and confer efforts were required prior to filing the motion. CCP § 2031.310(b)(2). TheCourt finds that prior to filing the motion, Plaintiff attempted to meet and confer in good faith.Merits. CCP § 2031.010 reads, in part: (a) Any party may obtain discovery within the scope delimited by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2017.010), and subject to the restrictions set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2019.010), by inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling documents, tangible things, land or other property, and electronically stored information in the possession, custody, or control of any other party to the action. … (d) A party may demand that any other party allow the party making the demand, or someone acting on the demanding party’s behalf, to enter on any land or other property that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made, and to inspect and to measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the land or other property, or any designated object or operation on it.Plaintiff served the Inspection Demand on May 8, 2024, which is timely per CCP § 2031.020. The InspectionDemand complies with CCP § 2031.030. Defendants did not file for a protective order under CCP § 2031.060.Instead, Defendants responded with objections on June 12, 2024. “On receipt of a response to demand forinspection…the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if thedemanding party deems that … [an] objection in the response is without merit or too general.” CCP §2031.310(a).The demand includes eight numbered locations or categories that Plaintiff seeks to inspect. Locations 2-8 arespecific locations, which all appear to be relevant to one of more of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court is very familiarwith the facts alleged by both sides in this matter, having recently ruled on Defendants’ Motion for SummaryJudgment and/or Adjudication. Photographs and measurements of Locations 2-8 could assist a trier of fact inunderstanding events that took place and in judging the veracity of statements made about those events. Location1 is “All locations where Plaintiff performed her job duties.” It does not appear that there is a single location inthe Hallmark House that would not be encompassed by this description and the Court considers Location 1 toinclude the entire interior and exterior of the Hallmark House.In addition to the numbered locations, Plaintiff included a paragraph at lines 25-28 about inspection of alltimekeeping systems and videos. There has been no basis provided for this request and it is vague and ambiguous.The Court recognizes that the residents at the Hallmark House have a privacy interest in their residence. TheCourt also recognizes that Plaintiff has a compelling interest in obtaining this evidence. The less intrusive meansof obtaining this information (floorplan or testimony) do not appear to be sufficient to protect Plaintiff’s interest.When considering the respective interests and the balancing test set forth in Hill v. National Collegiate AthleticAssn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s interest in obtaining this evidence outweighs the potentialinvasion of privacy. It appears to the Court that an inspection could be done in a manner that does not disrupt theresidents, i.e. doing in the inspection when residents are in their bedrooms or congregated in one area of the home.The Court encourages the parties to work together in this regard.The Court rules as follows: Defendant Quality Care Homes, Inc. shall permit Plaintiff, one attorney, and onephotographer to enter the Hallmark House to take pictures and measurements in locations 1-8, excluding anyresidents’ bedroom or bathrooms. This should allow Plaintiff to obtain the evidence requested with minimaldisruption to the residents. Plaintiff is not to photograph any resident or employee. The Court is not orderinginspection of “any and all time keeping systems, including electronic and hard copy system and videotapes onpremises.” During the inspection, Plaintiff is able to photograph the location of security cameras on the premises.This inspection should take place at a mutually agreeable date and time no later than twenty days from the serviceof the Notice of Entry of Order.Sanctions. “[T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney whounsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the onesubject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of thesanction unjust.” The Court does not find that Defendants acted with substantial justification or thatcirc*mstances are present that would make the imposition of the sanction unjust. The Court will award monetarysanctions. However, the amount of sanctions requested is excessive. Plaintiff seeks twelve hours of attorneytime at $550 per hour. No evidence was provided that would justify such a high hourly rate for Troy Candiottiand no evidence was presented as to what rate Adam Reisner is requesting. The Court finds $300 per hour to bea reasonable rate. Sanctions are awarded in the amount of $3,660 which is comprised of twelve hours at $300per hour plus a $60 motion fee.The motion is GRANTED as outlined above. Sanctions are awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $3,660.Plaintiff provided a proposed Order that will be modified to reflect the Court’s ruling.****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings******************************************************************************************
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Mark Maldonado, Cynthia Maldonado VS. Rogelio Diaz
Sep 28, 2023 |Injury or Damage - Motor Vehicle (OCA) |CL-23-3876-E
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IRMA AGUILAR, JOSE HERNANDEZ VS. NATALYA ASHBURN
Jul 14, 2023 |Alberto Garcia |Injury or Damage - Motor Vehicle (OCA) |CL-23-2742-F
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Mark Maldonado, Cynthia Maldonado VS. Rogelio Diaz
Sep 28, 2023 |Injury or Damage - Motor Vehicle (OCA) |CL-23-3876-E
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Duke Energy Renewables, Inc. VS. Eagle Investments, Birdie Industrial Services, LLC, Rocio N. Lopez, Raul Delgado Guerra
Jun 22, 2023 |Rose Guerra Reyna |All Other Civil Cases (OCA) |C-2477-23-D
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IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF Carlos Cantu VS. Magdalena Cantu
Apr 09, 2024 |Divorce - No Children (OCA) |F-1462-24-D
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Kirban Keller, Isis Keller VS. Noe Garza, PPM Logistics LLC
Aug 24, 2023 |Rose Guerra Reyna |Injury or Damage - Motor Vehicle (OCA) |C-3441-23-D
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AGUA SANTA, LLC VS. ALBERTO YNOSENCIO AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS
Jun 14, 2024 |JP Appeal |CL-24-2575-G
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The State of Texas VS. EFRAIN ZAMBRANO
Jul 16, 2024 |Habeas Corpus |C-3286-24-H
