The Euthyphro is one of Plato's mostinteresting and important early dialogues. Its focus is on thequestion: What is piety? Euthyphro, a priest of sorts, claims toknow the answer, but Socrates shoots down each definition heproposes. After five failed attempts to define piety Euthyphrohurries off leaving the question unanswered.
The Dramatic Context
It is 399 BCE. Socrates and Euthyphro meet by chance outside thecourt in Athens where Socrates is about to be tried on charges ofcorrupting the youth and impiety (or more specifically, notbelieving in the city's gods and introducing false gods). At histrial, as all of Plato's readers would know, Socrates was foundguilty and condemned to death. This circ*mstance casts a shadowover the discussion. For as Socrates says, the question he's askingon this occasion is hardly a trivial, abstract issue that doesn'tconcern him. As it will turn it will turn out, his life is on theline.
Euthyphro is there because he isprosecuting his father for murder. One of their servants had killeda slave, and Euthyphro's father had tied the servant up and lefthim in a ditch while he sought advice about what to do. When hereturned, the servant had died. Most people would consider itimpious for a son to bring charges against his father, butEuthyphro claims to know better. He was probably a kind of priestin a somewhat unorthodox religious sect. His purpose in prosecutinghis father is not to get him punished but to cleanse the householdof blood guilt. This is the kind of thing he understands, and theordinary Athenian does not.
The Concept of Piety
The English tern "piety" or "the pious" translates the Greek word"hosion." This word might also be translated as holiness orreligious correctness. Piety has two senses:
- A narrow sense: knowing and doingwhat is correct in religious rituals. For example, knowing whatprayers should be said on any specific occasion, or knowing how toperform a sacrifice.
- A broad sense: righteousness; beinga good person.
Euthyphro begins with the first,narrower sense of piety in mind. But Socrates, true to his generaloutlook, tends to stress the broader sense. He is less interestedin correct ritual than in living morally.
Euthyphro's 5 Definitions
Socrates says, tongue in cheek, as usual, that he's delighted tofind someone who's an expert on piety. Just what he needs in hispresent situation. So he asks Euthyphro to explain to him whatpiety is. Euthyphro tries to do this five times, and each timeSocrates argues that the definition is inadequate.
1st Definition:Piety is what is Euthyphro is doing now, namely prosecutingwrongdoers. Impiety is failing to do this.
Socrates'Objection: That's just an example of piety, not a generaldefinition of the concept.
2nd Definition:Piety is what is loved by the gods ("dear to the gods" in sometranslations). Impiety is what is hated by the gods.
Socrates'Objection: According to Euthyphro, the gods sometimesdisagree among themselves about questions of justice. So somethings are loved by some gods and hated by others. On thisdefinition, these things will be both pious and impious, whichmakes no sense.
3rd Definition:Piety is what is loved by all the gods. Impiety is what all thegods hate.
Socrates'Objection: The argument Socrates uses to criticize thisdefinition is the heart of the dialogue. His criticism is subtlebut powerful. He poses this question: Do the gods love pietybecause it is pious, or is it pious because the gods love it? Tograsp the point of the question, consider this analogous question:Is a film funny because people laugh at it, do people laugh at itbecause it's funny? If we say it's funny because people laugh atit, we're saying something rather strange. We're saying that thefilm only has the property of being funny because certain peoplehave a certain attitude towards it. But Socrates argues that thisgets things the wrong way round. People laugh at a film because ithas a certain intrinsic property, the property of being funny. Thisis what makes them laugh.
Similarly, things aren't piousbecause the gods view them in a certain way. Rather, the gods lovepious actions such as helping a stranger in need, because suchactions have a certain intrinsic property, the property of beingpious.
4th definition:Piety is that part of justice concerned with caring for thegods.
Socrates'Objection: The notion of care involved here is unclear. Itcan't be the sort of care a dog owner gives to its dog since thataims at improving the dog, but we can't improve the gods. If it'slike the care a slave gives his master, it must aim at somedefinite shared goal. But Euthyphro can't say what that goalis.
5th Definition:Piety is saying and doing what is pleasing to the gods at prayerand sacrifice.
Socrates'Objection: When pressed, this definition turns out to bejust the third definition in disguise. After Socrates shows howthis is so, Euthyphro says in effect, "Oh dear, is that the time?Sorry, Socrates, I have to go."
General Points About the Dialogue
The Euthyphro is typical of Plato's early dialogues: short;concerned with defining an ethical concept; ending without adefinition being agreed upon.
The question: "Do the gods lovepiety because it is pious, or is it pious because the gods loveit?" is one of the great questions posed in the history ofphilosophy. It suggests a distinction between an essentialistperspective and a conventionalist perspective. Essentialists applylabels to things because they possess certain essential qualitieswhich make them what they are. The conventionalist view is that howwe regard things determines what they are. Consider this question,for instance:
Are works of art in museums becausethey are works of art, or do we call them 'works of art' becausethey are in museums?
Essentialists assert the firstposition, conventionalists the second.
Although Socrates generally gets thebetter of Euthyphro, some of what Euthyphro says makes a certainamount of sense. For instance, when asked what human beings cangive the gods, he replies that we give them honor, reverence, andgratitude. The British philosopher Peter Geach has argued that thisis a pretty good answer.
